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Abstract: This paper evaluates the United Nations’ (UN) involvement and efforts in Western Sahara, and 
assesses its perceived effectiveness in settling this conflict in the post-Cold War international order. The 
dispute in Western Sahara is the most protracted conflict in the history of the UN. Its settlement would 
provide a crucial platform for the progress of other unresolved conflicts under UN auspices. As a mediator 
and an intervening party, the UN has played a major role in the dispute, especially since the establishment 
of the UN Mission for Western Sahara, MINURSO. After outlining the history of the Western Sahara conflict, 
this paper elucidates the stages the UN has managed therein, and clarifies the reasons and motives behind 
the deadlock in the Sahara. The UN’s efforts are evaluated, and the negotiating perspectives of the 
concerned parties in the conflict and role of Algeria, which considers itself not formally part of the conflict 
despite its role in preserving the current impasse, analyzed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Historical and Political Context: Origins and Development of the Western Sahara Conflict 
 
Western Sahara is a territory in North Africa bordered by Algeria, Mauritania, 
and Morocco. Formerly a Spanish colony known as Spanish Sahara, the area is 
characterized by an historical and on-going territorial conflict between the Kingdom of 
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Morocco and Sahrawi rebel movement Polisario (the Frente Popular de Liberación de 
Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), which is backed by Algeria. A dispute marked by 
colonization, decolonization, invasion, and an intermittent political stalemate has given 
rise to “one of the longest, most intractable conflicts in Africa” (Munday 2009, 115-122). 
Historically, many Moroccan dynasties have ruled in Western Sahara for almost 
a thousand years. The first dynasty that ruled over the Sahara was the Almoravid 
starting in 1060 A.D. (Jensen 2005). Under the rule of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, the Almoravid 
Dynasty governed large areas in Northern Africa and Southern Europe (Almoravids 
2014). These areas comprised what is currently known as Western Sahara and most of 
southern Spain. Control over the Moroccan territory shifted from one dynasty to 
another over the years. Each dynasty that took over Morocco controlled various 
territories according to the power it held (Jensen 2005, 23).  
By the XVII century, Moulay Ismail, an Alaouite sultan, took over a large territory 
through his victorious expeditions in the Sahara (Jensen 2005, 22). When Moulay Ismail 
died in 1727, fighting between his sons left Morocco divided for decades, and power 
over the large territory became intermittent (Jensen 2005, 22). The Moroccan territory 
was split into Bled Makhzen, lands ruled by the Sultan where he had religious and 
political sovereignty, and Bled Siba, where the Sultan had religious sovereignty but no 
political control (Hodges 1984, 25). 
 
Foreign Protectorates in Western Sahara 
 
In 1884, Spain, a latecomer to the colonial scramble for Africa, seized Western 
Sahara. Local tribes refused to accept this territorial claim, instead choosing to engage 
in a 50-year fight against the colonial power for control of the land. After Morocco won 
independence of its northern territory in 1956, Spain maintained control over the coastal 
region of the country known as Western Sahara. June and July 1956 marked the start of 
the Morocco Liberation Army’s (MLA) actions and two major Saharan tribes—Tekna and 
Reguibat—against Spanish rule to have Western Sahara reintegrated into Morocco 
(Attillio 1972, 195-205). 
In February 1957, the MLA launched its attack against the French posts. The 
Spaniards and their supporters were defeated, and their installations and garrisons 
destroyed. In February 1958, with the support of the French military, the Spanish army 
retaliated via a joint military operation named Ouragan, during which the MLA was 
heavily defeated (Mercer 1974, 220-224). End of Spanish occupation of Western Sahara 
and creation of the liberation movement. In 1963, Morocco successfully lobbied to have 
the United Nations (UN) formally declare Western Sahara a non-self-governing territory 
and requested Spain to decolonize it in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 (Rockower, 2002). 
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Later, in December 1965, the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) first 
resolution associated with this issue, Resolution 2072 (XX) of 17 December 1965 
compelled Spain to decolonize Western Sahara and start talks regarding the sovereignty 
of the territory (Theophilopoulou 2006). In May 1967, to appease criticism, Spain 
established a Sahrawi General Assembly known as the Djemaa, giving the appearance 
that the Sahara was moving toward self-determination (Rockower 2002, 8). This 
assembly comprised several Sahrawi tribes; however, a Sahrawi political organization 
known as the Saharan Liberation Movement (MLS) was created to counter the Djemaa. 
Mohamed Sidi Ibrahim Basiri was the leader of the movement. 
The new movement grew and members started to gather in peaceful 
assemblies and publish articles about the decolonization of Spanish Sahara and self-
determination of Western Sahara. Frequent protests and assemblies soon developed 
into massive nationalist propaganda. The UN supported the movement, and in 1967, 
started demanding that Spain decolonize the territory. As a result of the UN’s repeated 
insistence for a self-determination referendum and desire to decolonize Western 
Sahara, Spain started changing its colonist politics from the Francoist strategies of 
control to democratic politics. However, Spain continued to maintain its military bases 
and protectorate status in Western Sahara. 
Throughout the period between 1966 and 1973, the UNGA adopted resolutions 
on this issue every year (MINURSO 2017) all of which emphasized the need to hold a 
referendum on self-determination. Furthermore, resistance against the Spanish 
occupation continued to grow in several ways. A number of Saharawis were motivated 
by other revolutionary movements in the third world, and started pursuing self-
determination, which the UN resolutions highly recommended and urged. The 
Saharawis then started to organize into various resistance organizations under the 
backing of interested countries. These groups engaged in various roles at different times 
during the resistance struggle against the Spanish occupation of Western Sahara. 
Morocco endorsed the Liberation and Unity Front (FLU), Spain sponsored the Sahrawi 
National Union Party (PUNS), the Touareg Mouvement Revolutionnaire des Hommes 
Bleus (MOREHOB) was first backed by Algeria but turned to Morocco in 1975, and the 
Front for the Liberation of the Seguiet el-Hamra and the Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) were 
established in 1973 (Harvey 1988, 12-13). All these organizations were overturned or 
absorbed by other organizations; however, the Polisario became the dominant Sahrawi 
guerrilla group against Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict. 
Initially, the Polisario Front, a liberation group founded on 10 May 1973 by 
Mustapha Sayed El Ouali, aimed to “opt for revolutionary violence and armed struggle 
as the means by which the Saharawi population can recover its total liberty and foil the 
maneuvers of Spanish colonialism” (Hodges 1984, 27). However, the group changed its 
course of action, delivering an ambiguous statement in favor of full independence of 
Western Sahara during its second congress in August 1974.  
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This announcement proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) 
as a government-in-exile in Algeria. The Polisario movement has since received the 
political, military, and diplomatic backing of the Algerian regime against Morocco. 
On 14 November 1975, Spain eventually withdrew from Western Sahara 
through the Madrid Accords signed jointly with Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco. This 
accord deferred administration of the territory to Morocco (the northern two-thirds) and 
Mauritania (the southern third) after a transitional tripartite administration period. 
Subsequently, in 1976, the SADR, with a government in exile in Algeria, was founded 
with the aim to establish a sovereign state in Western Sahara. Serious fighting took 
place between the SADR’s national liberation movement, Polisario forces, Mauritania, 
and Morocco. Consequently, Mauritania signed a ceasefire agreement with the Polisario 
in August 1975, renouncing its part of Western Sahara. Morocco immediately took 
control of most of the southern part of the territory formerly occupied by Mauritania.  
 
UN-LED MEDIATION IN RESOLVING THE WESTERN SAHARIA CONFLICT:  
GENESIS OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT 
 
The UN involvement in the Western Sahara conflict has been on-going for 
almost 40 years, 24 of them supporting a peacekeeping mission. Under UN auspices, 
the Western Sahara conflict experienced four different but overlapping phases: 
statutory, norm setting, crisis management, and conflict resolution. Jacques Rousselier 
described the four stages and how they were frequently marked by different viewpoints, 
coded words, puzzlement, and diplomatic opacity (Boukhars and Roussellier 2014, 143-
144). 
 
Statutory: Establishing the Legal Framework of the Conflict 
 
In 1962, Morocco put the issue of Western Sahara, then under Spanish 
occupation, on the UN agenda. This is why successive resolutions of the UNGA called 
for negotiations between Morocco and Spain. In 1963, the UN was first requested to 
view the Western Sahara dispute as an issue pertaining to decolonization processes. 
This early period is referred to as statutory involvement during which the UN defined 
the legal and institutional structure of the dispute. 
In 1965, the UNGA issued a resolution accepting the provisions of a resolution 
released on 16 October 1964 by the UN “Special Committee on the situation with regard 
to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara”. This strongly urged Spain to 
relinquish these regions from “colonial domination and to this end, to enter into 
negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two territories” 
(United Nations General Assembly 1965, Resolution 2072).  
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A year later, another UNGA resolution included a decolonization call similar to 
the previous ones, urging “the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous 
population of its right to self-determination”. It also pushed for “the holding of a 
referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous 
population of the territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination”. The 
resolutions that followed from 1967 to 1974 did not bring new outcomes. However, they 
reiterated former calls to “take all the necessary steps to ensure that only the indigenous 
people of the territory participate in the referendum” (United Nations General Assembly 
1968, Resolution 2428). Furthermore, the resolutions indirectly called on states to refrain 
from economic exploitation of the territory and its peoples, including new investment 
(United Nations General Assembly 1969, Resolution 2591).  
In the two-track approach adopted by the UN over the years on its Western 
Sahara conflict resolution, the decolonization issue and process developed into a 
historically fixed and ideologically rooted narrative of the dispute. In the 1960s and 
1970s, during the postcolonial era, the UNGA envisioned full self-determination as a 
goal for all peoples subject to “alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation”, and 
intolerable political living conditions it identifies as a denial of a people's fundamental 
human rights (United General Assembly 1960, Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution 1514). This theory of self-determination presumed that the majority of 
inhabitants in any colony would be free to choose their future political status, although 
the integrity of established national boundaries would continue to be respected. The 
Western Sahara territory has a defined indigenous population, and the indigenous 
inhabitants of the territory have the exclusive right to self-determination and 
independence. That right can only be achieved through a referendum of self-
determination. 
 
Normative: Crisis Management Approach 
 
The UN shifted from laying the foundations of the legal framework of the 
conflict in the early 1960s and 1970s to crisis management, which was taken over by the 
Security Council, who proposed options for the resolution of the conflict. 
Despite that the Security Council has been engaged with the management of 
Western Sahara, until now, this conflict continues to be discussed and subject to 
resolutions by the UNGA Special Political and Decolonization Committee. This clearly 
violates Article 12 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that while the Security Council is 
exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the 
present Charter, the UNGA shall not make any recommendation with regard to that 
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests. 
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This two-fold involvement in this crisis laid new and lasting norms for settling 
the conflict. Noteworthy is that other external and political outcomes also interfered in 
framing the UN and International Court of Justice implications regarding settling the 
dispute. In addition, the renewal of Spain’s obligation to carry out a referendum under 
UN auspices to set out the status of the territory led Morocco to protest Spain’s 
methods and activities. 
Moroccan endorsement of self-determination was built on a well-grounded 
assumption that the population of Western Sahara, if given the opportunity, would 
choose reunification with the Moroccan motherland. The links between Morocco and 
Western Sahara were considered historically strong and only broken and divided by 
colonial rule. 
Furthermore, after a legal disagreement between Morocco and Mauritania over 
the status of Western Sahara, Morocco took the initiative and asked the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), under the UNGA, for an advisory opinion regarding the legal 
status of Western Sahara before the colonization of Spain. The ICJ was requested to 
answer the following two questions: (1) At the time of colonization by Spain, was 
Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakia El Hamra) a territory belonging to no one (Terra 
Nelius)? (2) What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the Mauritanian entity? While the ICJ was investigating the matter, Spain was 
requested to pause its planned plebiscite to allow the Court time to reach an opinion. 
On 16 October 1975, the ICJ submitted its advisory opinion, which unanimously 
recognized that Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra were not terra nullius before their 
colonization by Spain. The advisory opinion further acknowledged the following: 
At the time of Spanish Colonization, there existed legal ties of allegiance 
between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the 
territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, 
including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties 
between the Mauritania entity, as understood by the Court, and the 
territory of Western Sahara (International Court of Justice 1975, Western 
Sahara: Advisory Opinion). 
 
In diplomatic terms, the ICJ advisory opinion was endorsed as a sharp 
compromise between the unquestionable right of self-determination and convincing 
legal ties between Morocco (and Mauritania) and the Western Sahara territory. Thus, 
despite that the Court’s outcome viewed self-determination as an option for the people 
of the territory of Western Sahara, acknowledging the existence of legal ties between 
the sultan of Morocco and some of the other tribes living in the territory’ gave the 
incentive to King Hassan II to consider what he claimed regarding Morocco’s 
sovereignty in the region. A few hours after the ICJ’s verdict, Hassan II launched the 
Green March in which 350,000 Moroccans crossed into Western Sahara urging the 
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Spaniards to withdraw south by several kilometers. The Green March forced Spain to 
submit a petition to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take actions under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, marking the beginning of its involvement in the Western 
Sahara dispute.  
 
Conflict Management 
 
Despite UNSC and UNGA resolutions and recommendations along with 
pressure from the US calling on Morocco to renounce the Green March, on 6 
November 1975, Hassan II went ahead with his plans. The same day, the UNSC 
submitted a strongly worded resolution that “deplored” the Green March, urging 
Morocco to “immediately withdraw from the territory of Western Sahara all the 
participants in the March” (United Nations Security Council 1975, Resolution 380). Spain 
relinquished administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, and later 
informed the UNSC that it had ended its presence in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, the 
transfer of the territory did not change the status of Western Sahara as a non-self-
governing territory under UN auspices. 
Hence, the ICJ’s advisory opinion re-established the framework of a future 
resolution in many important phases. First, it acknowledged Morocco and Mauritania’s 
historical and legal ties to Western Sahara. Second, it recognized Algeria’s role in the 
conflict. Finally, it extended the scope of the UN’s initial identification of the dispute as 
the right to self-determination and independence. Thus, the ICJ advisory opinion 
reframed the conflict by altering it in future resolutions from a decolonization matter to 
a political dispute with defined interested parties, specifically, Morocco, Mauritania, and 
Algeria. 
In 1976, the UNGA took up the Western Sahara issue, acknowledging the role 
of the Organization of the African Union (OAU), now African Union (AU), in finding a 
resolution to the dispute. The UNGA supported OAU Resolution 104, in which the 
organization provided for the first time fundamental reviews of a settlement plan 
whereby parties interested in the conflict needed to enter into negotiation. It also urged 
parties involved in the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco, and the Polisario Front to 
enter into direct negotiations to bring about a cease-fire to create the necessary 
conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for the self-determination of the people 
of Western Sahara under the auspices of the OAU and UN (United Nations General 
Assembly 1984, Resolution 39/40). This shift happened because of the failure of 
Morocco and the Polisario to achieve a political solution. Furthermore, under the 
auspices of the UNSC and OAU, the UNGA pressured the concerned parties to 
negotiate, in the shortest possible time and in conformity with resolution AHG/Res. 104 
(XIX) and the present resolution, the terms of a cease fire and the modalities for 
organizing the said referendum (United Nations General Assembly 1985, Resolution 
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A/RES/40/50). This resolution offered a large mandate for the former United Nations 
Secretary General (UNSG) Perez De Cuellar to mediate the conflict between the parties, 
known as the proximity talks that occurred in April 1986.1 
 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
The Settlement Plan: Inescapable Failure  
 
Taking note of the agreement in principle, the UNSC requested the UNSG to 
appoint a special representative to work on the issue and report to the council as soon 
as possible on the holding of a referendum for the self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara and on ways and means to ensure the organization and supervision of 
such a referendum by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of the 
African Unity (United Nations Security Council 1988, Resolution 621). 
The UN Settlement Proposals as set in the UNSG’s report and accepted by the 
parties on 30 August 1988 was only seconded after two years by the UNSG’s offices 
(United Nations Security Council 1990, Resolution 658).  Perez De Cuellar affirmed the 
two concerned parties in the conflict, namely Morocco and the Polisario, without 
mentioning Algeria explicitly, despite that the latter had a role in drafting the 
implementation plan. Noteworthy is that in the UN; the task force in charge of drafting 
the implementation plan did not liaise with the UNSG and his close team, who were 
extensively implicated in the negotiations with parties. 
Successive UNGA Resolutions reiterated that the parties enter into direct 
negotiations and urged them to implement the referendum on self-determination. 
Many experts claim that the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara lacked fundamental 
agreement on principals and processes for the envisioned self-determination 
referendum. The plan was supposed to assist the parties in finding a basis of mutual 
interest regarding voter eligibility and voter lists. In fact, this agreement should have 
been established before the start of the transition period. According to Jacques 
Rousselier, the UN Settlement plan faced in particular overt challenges regarding 
identifying voters for the referendum. This was the cornerstone of the UNSC biannual 
resolutions, except in 1992, where the council did not take up the question of Western 
Sahara, and in 1996, when it issued four resolutions taking a supportive stand on the 
UNSG’s efforts to find solutions and compromises on voter eligibility, and calling for the 
parties full cooperation with the UN Mission on the ground. 
                                                          
1
 Author’s interview with a former Moroccan Ambassador to Morocco in Algeria, April 2014. 
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The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 
was established by UNSC resolution 690 of 29 April 1991 in accordance with settlement 
proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Polisario Front. The last two 
resolutions in 1996 included requests by the council to seek “alternative steps in the 
framework of the Settlement Plan should there be no meaningful progress toward 
removing obstacles to the implementation of the Plan” (Boukhars and Roussellier 2014, 
152-153). Clearly, these puzzling appeals neglect the exploration of alternative ways; 
however, they address the impasses in the plan and seek solutions within the Settlement 
Plan system. 
On 9 May 1996, the UNSG recommended postponing the work of the UN 
Mission’s Identification Commission and reducing the number of civilian police and 
military personnel, while paving the way for a solution to voter identification. However, 
the stalemate on voter identification was noted in the UNSG report, which lead to 
remain at the full disposal of the parties should they agree to hold talks in whatever 
format to facilitate a settlement of their conflict (United Nations Security Council 1996, 
Report of the Secretary General on the situation Concerning Western Sahara).  However, 
many observers overlooked, purposefully or by a lack of understanding, that from the 
start, a major procedural flaw meant that the Settlement Plan had no chance of being 
implemented. This weakness, which made the plan unfeasible, is the way Morocco and 
the Polisario interpreted it, each from their own perspective (Jensen 2005, 22). 
Issa Diallo, a special assistant to Perez de Cuellar’s task force responsible for 
producing the details of the Settlement Plan, led separate secret meetings with both 
Morocco and the Polisario. He did not share the reservations of the concerned parties 
regarding the Plan with other task force members and the UNSC (Bergh 2007). 
This clarifies both parties’ vehement opposition to and apparent frustrations 
with the many paragraphs contained in the draft plan. With the appointment of the 
former US Secretary of State James A. Baker III as the UNSG’s personal envoy for 
Western Sahara, he resumed the voter identification process in December 1997. He 
developed a resolution for disputed issues (code of conduct for the referendum 
campaign; confinement of Polisario troops; and a decrease in the number of Moroccan 
troops, refugees, prisoners of war, and political prisoners) under the Houston 
Agreements adopted in September 1997. After several attempts to resume the 
implementation of the Settlement Plan, the Secretary General and his personal envoy 
concluded three critical observations. Regarding the issue of the voter identification 
process, it concluded that after nine years of UN operations in Western Sahara, 
throughout the identification process, the cooperation of one or the other party with 
MINURSO has been predicated upon its perception of how the results might be 
favoring the other side. As per the appeals, it deduced that the respective positions of 
the two parties do not augur well for an early resolution of the issue of admissibility of 
appeals for hearings. Under these circumstances, the timetable envisaged is no longer 
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valid, and the date of the referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed since 1991, 
can still not be set with certainty at this juncture. Finally, the report noted, the 
experience has shown that each time the United Nations has proposed a technical 
solution to bridge the parties differing interpretation of a given provision of the 
settlement plan, a new difficulty, requiring yet another round of protracted 
consultations, arises (United Nations Security Council 2000, Report of the Secretary 
General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara). 
On that account, the UN envoy on Western Sahara held four meetings to 
consider the call of the international community to settle this issue. Based on the 
outcomes of these meetings, Baker thought, it is much better to reach a political 
solution than seeing the process collapse, as this could lead to the resumption of 
hostilities, which must be avoided at any cost (Cuéllar 1997, 352). 
To summarize, the way in which the Settlement Plan was adopted reveals that 
the principal intent of the UN was to reach an agreement, as early as possible, between 
the protagonists and call off the war, not advance a viable proposal that could 
materialize on the ground. 
Since the adoption of the UN Settlement Plan in 1991, the UN has for more than 
a decade focused on achieving a solution to the territorial question, which pits Morocco 
against the Algerian-backed Polisario, by means of a referendum with the option of 
independence among the envisaged outcomes. 
In his memoirs entitled Pilgrimage for Peace, Perez de Cuellar was convinced 
that the Settlement Plan could not address all the concerns of the two parties and that a 
compromise solution had to be sought. He declared: “I was never convinced that 
independence promised the best future for the inhabitants of Western Sahara”.2 
 
The Framework Agreement 
 
In September 2000, Morocco proposed a new solution to the dispute to the 
Polisario Front, which was not aligned with the Settlement Plan. Morocco`s platform of 
negotiation was its plan to grant autonomy to Western Sahara; however, this initiative 
did not go further. This led James Baker to share with the UNSC the draft Framework 
Agreement on the status of Western Sahara, which was presented to the parties. 
The agreement provided a five-year period of autonomy followed by a 
referendum on the status of the territory. The Polisario and its regional backer Algeria 
rejected the draft Framework Agreement, as they perceived it as yielding to Morocco’s 
inspirations while providing too little to their own claims.  
                                                          
2
 Author’s interview with Anna Theophilopoulou, Former UN official, New York, 2014. 
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Baker presented the draft Framework Agreement in a revised form as the Peace 
Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara in 2003, which entailed a 
powerful endorsement from the UNSC. The plan offered a referendum on the final 
status of the territory for the population of Western Sahara and included independence, 
integration with Morocco, and self-governance or autonomy. Despite that Algeria 
submitted a detailed criticism in writing of the draft in response, it accepted the plan 
and pushed the Polisario to do so as well (Jensen 2005, 111). 
Morocco rejected the plan, arguing that Baker’s new proposal was aligned with 
the failed Settlement Plan, reintroducing the holding of the referendum that would 
provide the concerned parties with the initial options. Actually, this plan did not consider 
the sociological, tribal, and ethnic composition of the population of Western Sahara, as 
well as the need for the genuine adhesion of all populations to the status given to them. 
After Morocco`s official rejection of the plan, the UNSG’s Personal Envoy James 
Baker resigned, resulting in a sudden end to UN and US mediation efforts. After a two-
year gap, the Secretary General appointed Peter van Walsum to the post in 2006. 
Morocco decided to reinvigorate its autonomy plan for Western Sahara on 11 April 
2007. 
 
Autonomy Plan 
 
Van Walsum was appointed as the next UNSG envoy on Western Sahara. While 
Morocco presented its Autonomy plan for Western Sahara on 11 April 2007, the 
Polisario presented its own proposal, namely to re-launch the discussion on holding the 
referendum that would offer a choice between independence, autonomy, or integration 
into Morocco. The proposed autonomy plan presented by Morocco asserted that it was 
based on internationally recognized norms and standards, and detailed the proposed 
powers of the Sahara autonomous region, the bodies of the region, and modalities for 
approval by the population concerned with the statute (Agence France Presse, 2007). 
Through US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the US quickly welcomed the 
proposal, characterizing it as “serious and credible” (ElPais 2008). 
The Moroccan initiative was not a decisive solution, but provided a platform of 
negotiation. Following this development, the UNSC decided to drop the 50-year 
campaign for a referendum and urged the parties to engage in direct talks in good faith 
and without preconditions’ for a political solution. During the four talks held in 
Manhasset, New York in 2007 and 2008 under Van Walsum, the Polisario refused to 
discuss and consider autonomy or anything but independence. The new envoy made 
no progress in bridging the disagreement between Morocco’s autonomy plan and the 
Polisario’s position that a referendum on independence must be an option. In 2008, Van 
Walsum briefed the UNSC that the Polisario hoped for independence, which was 
unrealistic; thus, coming to terms with reality would be in the Saharans’ best interest 
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(Security Council Report, 2014 Mandate extension of the MINURSO). After this remark, 
the Polisario stopped dealing with him. For them, he remained a persona non grata until 
his contract ended. Christopher Ross, former US diplomat in Algeria, was appointed as 
Personal Envoy in 2009. From 2009 to 2016, Ross conducted 10 informal rounds of 
negotiations, which led to no progress given the fundamental differences between the 
parties’ positions. None were willing to concede to a compromise. Furthermore, during 
Mr. Ross’ appointment, several miscalculations by the UN secretariat under Ross and 
UNSG Ban Ki Moon impeded the negotiation process. 
In 2013 at the renewal of the MINURSO Mandate, Susan Rice, former US 
ambassador to the UN, introduced a broader mandate for the UN peacekeeping 
mission to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Western Sahara. This 
proposal was endorsed by several humanitarian organizations in the US, and severely 
criticized by Morocco. In addition, the MINURSO mission is the only one that does not 
have the power to monitor human rights. At least 5 of the 12 UN missions do not have 
the power to monitor human rights. Furthermore, Morocco embarked on improving its 
human rights in 2011 through the creation of regional human rights committees in 
Western Sahara to monitor and address the situation in the region under the authority 
of the National Council for Human Rights. This initiative was praised by the UNSC in 
resolutions No. 1979 and No. 2044 (Stone Walling on Refugees Rights, 2009). The UNSC 
soon withdrew the proposal to enlarge the mandate of the MINURSO. 
A few years later, the UNSG’s Personal Envoy started pushing for another 
alternative solution to the conflict. He indirectly shunned Morocco’s proposal, proposing 
a federation or commonwealth between Morocco and Western Sahara. The UN again 
failed to consider that this new proposal did not take into account the specifics of the 
Western Sahara region. Rather, it incorrectly compared the region with foreign countries 
that applied the system of commonwealth and federation, namely the US and the UK. 
Moreover, with the continuous impasse at the level of the UN to find a solution, 
Morocco unequivocally decided to not step back on the proposed autonomy plan, and 
dismissed any negotiations that would lead to independence. 
In the same years as Christopher Ross’ tenure, UNSG Ban Ki Moon made an 
undiplomatic move during his visit to Tindouf Camp in Algeria in March 2016. Following 
his meetings with Algerian officials and the Polisario leaders, Ban Ki moon expressed his 
endorsement of the Polisario, and intentionally described Morocco as an occupier of 
Western Sahara. His controversial comments about the ‘occupation’ of Western Sahara 
generated a great deal of pushback from a broad spectrum of Moroccan circles—from 
the government’s decision to cut the number of staffers and funding at the UN mission 
in the Sahara to global protests in different parts of the world. Currently, with the 
appointment of the new UNSG Antonio Guterres and the new UNSG, bringing the 
parties back to the negotiating table raises questions about the utility and promise of 
international mediation in the long-standing conflict in North Africa.  
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ALGERIA AS AN IMPORTANT PARTY IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
 
Since Morocco’s reintegration of Western Sahara, Algeria has contested the 
move and in retaliation, began supporting the Polisario militarily, diplomatically, and 
financially. The Algerian Republic was determined that by challenging Morocco’s claim 
to Western Sahara, it would prevent it from strengthening and enriching its position in 
North Africa, paving the way for Algeria to become the pre-eminent power in the 
region. While Algeria has never claimed its interest in the Saharan conflict, it has de 
facto been a major player therein. Since then, geopolitical rivalry ensued from Algeria, 
which sought dominance over the Maghreb.  
In addition, ideological differences have also played a role. Monarchical, 
capitalist, conservative, and pro-Western Morocco contrasts sharply with the 
revolutionary, former   single party, socialist, and anti-Western Algeria. In the UN, 
Algeria was deeply involved in helping the Polisario achieve the independence of 
Western Sahara through self-determination based on holding the referendum. This 
started with the second Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, who was staunchly in 
favor of Saharan self-determination. His agreement to provide the Polisario with 
weapons, political support, sanctuary, and information facilities caused continued 
intermittent tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations. Algeria’s efforts in the Western 
Sahara conflict, especially at the level of the UN, are comparable to those of an involved 
party such as Morocco. These efforts include Algeria’s input in the draft of the 
Framework Agreement, its push to incorporate human rights duties in MINURSO’s 
duties, quest for independence of Western Sahara, and refusal to deal with an 
appointed UNSG personal envoy who endorses Morocco’s efforts to reach a just and 
lasting political solution to this conflict, as in the cases of De Soto and Van Walsum. 
In its official communication to the UN, Algeria sometimes presented itself as “a 
concerned party” and an “important actor” or “party in the settlement of the dispute”. 
Another component impeding the resolution of this dispute is Algeria`s 
systematic refusal to allow the High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) to conduct an 
independent census to determine the number of Sahraoui living in the Tindouf Camps. 
The international community is pushing for an independent census to determine the 
number of Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria, but the effort is meeting considerable 
resistance. For more than 40 years, the UN has not succeeded in stopping Algeria from 
refusing requests from the UNHCR to fulfill its mandate and conduct a census of the 
Sahraoui population in Tindouf Camps in Southwest Algeria. 
While Algeria’s unjustified rejection can be easily considered in the context of its 
tense relations with Morocco and need to have the Sahraoui on its soil for its political 
propaganda, the refusal of the Polisario leaders is essentially driven by the profit they 
gain from an excessive estimation of the number of refugees by requesting more 
humanitarian aid.  
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Several reports published by UN agencies such as the UNHCR and World Food 
Programme highlight Algeria and the Polisario’s embezzlement of the humanitarian aid 
intended for the Sahraoui population in Tindouf. For Morocco, the solution of this 
conflict arises from a genuine contribution of the Algerian regime that must show the 
necessary political will to break the deadlock over the process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For more than 40 years, the UN has attempted to settle the Western Sahara 
dispute, balancing the concerns of two main party goals: autonomy/sovereignty and 
self-determination. The status quo is the result of an unusually substantial and 
consistent set of factors. First, interest in this dispute is small, and insufficient 
international attention is given to the conflict, despite the continuing major threats of 
terrorism developments and spike in instability and insecurity in the Sahel and 
neighboring regions, where links between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and 
the Polisario Front have been revealed. Second, the persistence of the intermittent 
historical tensions between Algeria and Morocco as well as Algeria’s lack of genuine 
commitment to resolving this dispute seriously hinders its resolution. Finally, the 
international community is unable to genuinely contribute to a solution, because there 
simply is no international interest in the conflict. In the UN, the lack of political 
momentum reveals the divergence of intentions between states in the UNSC or UNGA, 
or the upcoming rounds of negotiations. The conflict tested James Barker’s imagination 
and patience from 1997 to 2004, and he proposed a referendum that did not lead 
anywhere. His successor as the UNSG’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara, Peter Van 
Walsum, resigned after three years, because he believed that independence was not a 
viable solution. Christopher Ross, who after several meetings to discuss new proposals 
from the parties in 2007, did not succeed in making progress on the issue, replaced him. 
In September 2018, the new UNSG Personal Envoy to Western Sahara, Horst 
Kohler, invited Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front to re-launch 
negotiations in Geneva on 4 and 5 December,2018 with a new dynamic and spirit. With 
the new appointment of the UN chief in January 2017, Antonio Guterres, there is a need 
to implement a realistic vision to end this conflict. It is important to learn from the 
approaches of former UN diplomats, which did not lead Western Sahara to a major 
political solution, and from the stubbornness of the UNSC to pander to unfeasible 
mechanisms such as self-determination leading to independence.  
The latter instance, which when applied through the UN to some conflict zones 
such as in South Sudan, brought chaos and instability to the citizens. Finally, the UN’s 
mediation role in this conflict should be redefined in light of current developments in 
the region, as well as the threats of refugee Tindouf camps on the stability and security 
of the region and Algeria’s full-fledged role in the conflict.  
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